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Federal Tax Board of Appeals
By Frank Lowson
The confidence of the taxpayers in the treasury department’s
administration of the bureau of internal revenue has been shaken
by the recent discussions in the public prints and by erroneous
adverse decisions by the commissioner of internal revenue, but
notwithstanding these, the taxpayer’s hope of getting a square
deal has revived with the appearance of the Mellon bill which
offers a new tax board of appeals. One construction that could
be placed on that offer is that it is evident that the treasury
department and the commissioner recognize the need for improve
ment in the administration of the income-tax law. The country
is fortunate in having as secretary of the treasury a man who
has the courage to propose such a new board.
The Mellon bill proposes to have the board appointed by and
responsible to the secretary of the treasury, but in no way under
the commissioner of internal revenue, to sit as a semi-judicial
board hearing both the taxpayer and the commissioner of internal
revenue and to give an impartial judicial decision on the merits
of the cases presented to it. On the other hand several public
organizations have proposed to the ways and means committee of
the house that in order to give more impartial results, the proposed
board of tax appeals should be divorced from the treasury depart
ment and should be appointed by the president with the consent
of the senate. Congress must decide which of these proposals is
to be enacted into law.
It is desirable to restore the taxpayer’s confidence. To do so
it is necessary to provide such legal machinery as will in the
opinion of the taxpayer give him a fair and impartial decision
based solely on the merits of his tax case—as one witness before
the ways and means committee expressed it, will give him “a fair
run for his money.”
Many taxpayers are dissatisfied with the decisions made against
them by the commissioner. There can be no question that in
many cases these decisions are wrong and that the taxpayer is
justified in his dissatisfaction. Even in the cases where the
taxpayers’ dissatisfaction is not well founded, an impartial hearing
is necessary to determine that fact. Furthermore, even in the
cases where a taxpayer’s dissatisfaction is unreasonable, it is
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highly important, still, that a hearing be afforded him, because
the bureau of internal revenue is vitally interested in maintaining
the confidence of taxpayers that they will get an impartial hearing.
The bureau of internal revenue is helpless, in spite of its great
power, unless the rank and file of taxpayers have confidence in
its fairness. The taxpayer will forgive the bureau more easily
for being wrong, than for refusing to give a sufficient number of
impartial hearings. That is, the public values fairness above
accuracy. Both are important. If taxpayers are able to get an
expeditious, impartial hearing from a judicial board, before which
the government must be represented just as they are represented
—a board which does not combine the functions of judging and
advocacy—he will feel better satisfied that he is getting a “fair
run for his money.” It is not necessary to create a new judicial
board to pass on cases other than those adversely decided by the
commissioner.
The new bill is unwise insofar as it provides that opinions
shall not be written unless a special rule is made to that effect.
On the contrary, it should provide that unless the chairman
certifies “in the particular case that it is against the interest of
the government for an opinion to be written, an opinion shall be
written in every case.” This is necessary: (1) because otherwise
the board might be making a serious mistake, which the inter
ested party could discover in a few minutes and call to the
attention of the board for immediate correction, and (2) because
it is impossible to convince a litigant that a case is being fairly
decided if the judge refuses to give the reasons for his decision.
As to (1) above, it is clear that a taxpayer cannot point out a
mistake in fact or theory, no matter how flagrant it is, unless he
knows the ground on which the decision is reached, and he cannot
do that without an opinion. As to (2) above, there is virtually
a presumption in the mind of a taxpayer that a decision that will
not stand publication is probably not correct. To decide a case
right a judge must analyze it thoroughly in his mind. If he does
that, it is no trouble to write an opinion. If a judge finds that
the statement of his reasons for a decision is difficult, it means
that he has not had sufficient training to qualify him for his work,
or that he does not know the reasons himself.
The proposed secretary’s board, being a part of the treasury
department, cannot be unbiased as the proposed president’s board,
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which will more nearly have the status and independence of a
court. Regardless of the length of tenure of office, any member
of the secretary’s board could probably be removed on an inves
tigation and order of the secretary. The members of the
president’s board, confirmed by the senate, could not be removed
by any such procedure.
Other points of difference might be raised, all should be raised
now to assist congress in deciding what would best meet the
country’s needs. The discussion should eliminate personalities.
The present secretary of the treasury would undoubtedly appoint
the best man he could find. The president would do likewise.
A study of the tax simplification board report and the Mellon
bill supplemented by conversation with at least four prominent
officials of the treasury department, leads me to the conclusion
that the Mellon bill contemplates the discontinuance of the present
committee on appeals and review and that the proposed board of
tax appeals should take over the work of that committee.
It is hoped that that will not be done for several reasons:
1. The period of 30 days allowed by the Mellon bill in which
to appeal to the board from the commissioner’s decision may be
a sufficient time allowance to the taxpayer in which to complete
such an appeal from a decision previously rendered by the com
mittee on appeals and review but it certainly would not be sufficient
time to prepare and complete an appeal from a decision of the
income-tax unit to the board of tax appeals.
2. Conferences or discussions with the income-tax unit do not
in practice develop all the points of objection by the department
and in many cases do not develop the essential points on which
the case may ultimately be decided. The recent order by which
the taxpayer receives a copy of the unit’s contentions, unsupported
by argument or references though they may be, gives the taxpayer
an opportunity to prepare further to disprove the unit’s supposed
facts or arguments or contentions. And later, at the committee
on appeals and review hearings further information and briefs
have frequently to be filed, either at the hearings or following
thereon to answer the committeemen’s questions. Nothing should
be done by the Mellon bill or the department under that bill to
interfere with the foregoing process of developing the case and
arguments. If that procedure is cut short or abolished it will be
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a serious detriment to the taxpayer first, and to the government
second. This is the opinion of a number of practical men.
3. The new board is to be as nearly equivalent to a court as
possible. It should not be burdened with investigation work such
as the present committee on appeals and review must of necessity
do. The new board should only have to decide the appeals on
the cases rejected by the committee on appeals and review. That
would cut the board’s work fifty per cent. and enable it to much
more expeditiously give leading and authoritative decisions on
much that is wrong now. These leading and authoritative
decisions must then be accepted by the commissioner’s committee
on appeals and review or taken to court. If accepted the result
will be a clearing of the tracks for the committee on appeals and
review and an increased production therefrom with similar bene
ficial reflex action on the income-tax unit.
4. If the committee on appeals and review is abolished and all
its work transferred to the new board, that board will in a short
time find itself relatively in as bad a position as the committee on
appeals and review is now with respect to volume of cases decided.
5. The main object to be accomplished by the new board is
to restore the confidence of the taxpayer that he will get an
impartial judicial hearing. That can best and quickest be done
by submitting to the board only the cases decided adversely to
the taxpayer by the committee.
The membership of the new board should be made up of
lawyers, accountants or economists, and practical business men,
each class equally in proportion as nearly as may be.
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